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THE NORTH DAKOTA "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE"WAIVER BY TAKING DEPOSITIONS?
By LEO H.

0

WHINERY

North Dakota, pursuant to Section 31-0103 of the Code, still
clings to the statutory rule that in a suit by or against the personal
representatives, neither party. is qualified to testify against the, other
as to any transaction with the testator or intestate, unless called to
testify to that transaction by' the opposite party.' For the most part,
the scholarly and reasoned arguments for abandoning the rule
throughout the country have not been heeded,' nor, have the criticisms of the North Dakota statute provoked a change in this state.:'
Until such time as it is deemed wise to change the law, questions
will continue to arise as to its application in specific cases. The
general scope, interpretation and application of Section 31-0103
has already been critically analyzed in the North -Dakota Law R,*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
"In any civil action or proceeding by or
1. N. D. Rev. Code § 31-0103 (1943):
against executors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin in which judgment may be
rendered or ordered entered for or against them, neither party, except as provided in seetiohi 31-0104 and section 31-0105, shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any
transaction whatever with or statement by the testator or intestate, unless called to testify
thereto by the opposite party. Where a corporation is a party to any proceeding mentioned in this section, no agent, stockholder, officer, or manager of such corporation, shall be
permitted to testify to any transaction or conversation had with the testator or intestate."
The statutory exceptions provided for in Section 31-0103, supra, are: (1) the testimony of the surviving spouse regarding transactions with the deceased spouse touching
their business or property interests (§ 31-0104); and (2) the testimony of a party to an
action in which the prior testimony of a deceased person is used in behalf of his executors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin (§ 31-0105).
For the statutes from other jurisdictions, see 2 Wignore, Evidence § 488 (3d ed.
1940).
2. For example, see McCormick § 65 (1954): "Most commentators agree that . . .
the expedient of refusing altogether to listen to the survivor is, in the words of Bentham,
In seeking to avoid injustice to one side, the statutea 'blind and brainless' technique.
makers have ignored the equal possibility of injustice to the other. The temptation to the
survivor to fabricate a claim or defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any
jury will realize that his story must be cautiously heard. A searching cross-examination
will usually, in case of fraud, reveal discrepancies inherent in the 'tangled web' of deception. In any event, the survivor's disqualification is more likely to balk the honest- than
One who would not stick at perjury will hardly hesitate at
the dishonest survivor.
suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified, to swear to the false story."
See further, 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 578-578a (3d ed. 1940).
3. As to this, see St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930, 931 (1895):
There are
"Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground are of doubtful expediency.
more honest claims defeated by them by destroying the evidence to prove such claim than
there would be fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away, and
all persons rendered competent witnesses. To assume that in that event many false claims
would be established by perjury is to place an extremely low estimate on human nature,
He who possesses :.i
and a very high estimate on human ingenuity and adroitness.
'vidence to prove his case save that which such a statute declares incompetent is remediless. But those against whom a dishonest demand is made are not left utterly unprotected because death has sealed the lips of the only person who can contradict the surIn the legal armory, there is a weapon
vivor, who supports- his claim with his oath.
whose repeated thrusts he will find it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to parry if
his testimony is a tissue of falsehoods, - the sword of cross-examination."
For further discussion on the need for reform in North Dakota, see N. Dak. L.
Rev. i39, 139-140 & 146-148 (1954).
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view, but, in the interim, a somewhat more specialized question
has been raised. 4 This has to do with whether Section 31-0103 will
be waived by taking the deposition of the adverse: party pursuant
to Rule 26 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Of fundamental importance in considering the question is an examination of the nature and purpo.re ofdepositions as envisioned
by R'ule 26. It hardly requires any citation of authority for the proposition that Rule 26 has both a discovery and evidentiary purpose.
Rule 26(a) provides, inter alia, that "any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or
for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes." Further,
Rule 26(b) provides, in part, that "fle deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is r e 1 e v a n
to the subject matter involved in the pending action
land it] is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimoity sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." And,
under Rule 26(e), a party can object "at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason
which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness
were then present and testifying." Finally, in Rule 26.(f) it is provided that "a party shall not be deemed to make a person his owna
witness for any purpose by taking his deposition." Thus, it is apparent, in North Dakota, as under the Federal Rules, that Rule 26
serves the basic procedural need for discovery as well as providing a means for the preservation of testimony for purposes of trial.,
As noted, under Section 31-0103, a waiver occurs if either party
is "called to testify ... by the opposite party." The North Dakota
Supreme Court has held, consistent with this provision, that an examination of the adverse party as a witness, either on direct or
cross-examination, as to any transaction encompassed by the statute will constitute a waiver,' not only as to that part about which
he was interrogated, but as to the transaction in its entirety. 7 The
only exception to the rule which the Court appears to recognize is
4. See 30 N. Dak. L. Rev. 139 (1954).
5. See Moore, Federal Practice ]26.04 (2d ed. 1950).
6. International Shoe Co. v.. Hawkinson, 72 N.D. 622, 10 N.W.2d 590 (1943);
Frink v. Taylor, 59 N.D. 47, 228 N.W. 459 (1930).
7. See Frink v. Taylor, supra note 6 at 462: "But if 'called to testify thereto by
the opposite party,' then this bar is removed.
It will be noted that if 'called to testify
thereto,' that is, as to the transaction, the bar is removed. As soon as the plaintiff called
him to testify regarding any part of the transaction, then the defendant became a competent witness to testify regarding the transaction in its entirety."
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when it is demonstrated that the adverse party is clearly antagonistic to the deceased's estate.8
Not so obvious, however, is whether the waiver language "called
to testify" relates only to testimony given at trial, or during the
taking of a deposition as well.' In L rink v. Taylor,, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota, while not confronted with the question
posed, is reasonably clear in its opinion that the waiver language
in Section 31-0103 means the calling of the adverse party to testify
as a witness during trial."0 In consequence, the conclusion seems
inescapable that, by merely taking the deposition of the adverse
party, he is not "testifying" within the meaning of the waiver language of the statute. The testimony is sought for discovery, not
use in evidence. There appear to be no cases on the point in North
Dakota, but several Federal cases dealing with Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules support the conclusion.
In Duling v. Markun, from the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff-executors sued the defendant to recover a sum of money alleged to be
due on a loan from the decedent to the defendant.1" The Court
held contraiy to the defendant's contention, that he was incompetent to testify under the applicable Indiana statute and that his
incompetency had not been waived by the taking of his deposition.
The Court said:
"Plaintiffs did not offer the deposition in evidence. * * *
We do not think that a litigant in Federal Court must . . . refrain from taking advantage of the Federal Rules pertaining to
discovery . - . The Federal Rules themselves indicate that a
waiver should not result from the mere taking of a discovery
examination. Rule 26(f) provides, in substance, that a party shall
not be deemed to make a person2 his own witness for any purpose by taking his deposition."1
Earlier, in Anderson v. Benson," and in the most recent case of
McCargo v. Steele,14 the Federal District Court has reached the
same conclusion on reasoning similar to that employed in the
8. For a discussion of this exception, with a citation of authorities, see 30 N. Dak. L.
Rev. 139, 144 at n. 32 (1954).
9. Of course, for the purpose of this article, it is assumed that the deposition will include statements of the adverse party relating to a part, or the whole, of the transaction
with the testator or intestate. Otherwise, the question of waiver by deposition would not
arise at all. See Frink v. Taylor, supra note 7.
10. 59 N.D. 47, 228 N.W. 459, 462 (1930). See also, note 7 supra. See further, the
recent case of Bonogofsky v. Kraft, 92 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1958), concerning the waiver
of the statute by testimonial evidence.
11. 231 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956).
12. 231 F.2d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 1956).
13. 117 F. Supp. 765 (D.C. Nebr. 1953).
14. 160 F. Supp. 7 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
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Duling case. In the McCargo case, the waiver language in the
applicable Arkansas constitutional provision was exactly the same
as that in North Dakota's Section 31-0103.15 In the Anderson case,
the Nebraska statute provided that the adverse party had waived.
his right under the statute when he had "introduced a witness who
shall have testified."e Though varying slightly from the waiver
provision in the North Dakota statute, as we have observed, it
seems implicit from the Frink case, that this is precisely the meaning which the Supreme Court of North Dakota has given. to Section 31-0103. Though there: is a conflict of authority among the
several states on the point,'1 all of the Federal cases found are in
agreement, namely, that the mere taking of a deposition under
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules does not waive the rule of incompetency since it does not amount to an evidentiary use of the testimony. i"
There is one Federal case in which the District Court has held
that a taking and filing of the deposition constitutes a waiver of
the "dead man's statute." In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green, the
Court said:
"It appears to me that the deciding feature in the case is
whether or not the deposition was filed in the case and became
available for use. When so taken and filed, it has in reality
been used by the party taking it."'"
The Court reached its conclusion in the face of the relevant Kentucky statute which provided that incompetency was waived if a
party "shall have testified" against the adverse party. 2' In this respect it is contra to the, Duling, Anderson and McCargo cases.'
In support of its decision, the District Court said:
"[The party taking the deposition] has used it for the purpose
of obtaining all the information desired by him from a witness
otherwise incompetent, who would not be required to give such
information except by means of the deposition. Admissions
against interest may have been secured. It has been used to help
15. Ark Const. Schedule, § 2 (1874). "...
neither party shall be allowed to testify
against the other . . . unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party."
16. Nebr. R.R.S. § 25-1202 (1943).
17. See the following annotations: 64 A.L.R. 1148 (1929); 107 A.L.R. 482 (1937);
and 159 A.L.R. 411 (1945).
18. See Moore, Federal Practice
26.35 (Supp. 1957).
19. 37 F. Supp. 949, 952 (W. D. Ky. 1941).
20. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.210(2) (c) (Baldwin ed. 1955).
21. -It is not clear from the opinion in the Duling case whether the deposition was
filed. However, it is believed that the Court would have regarded the filing, in any
event, as inconsequential since the Court deemed the crucial question to be whether the
deposition had been introduced in evidence. See page 317 supra. And, in this co9pection,
see Rule 30(f) (1)
of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure which requires. .the
pending.
filing of the deposition with the court in which the action is
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prepare the adversary's case, and often most effectively. It is
available to be read to the jury whenever it is so desired by the
party taking it to contradict any other witness on the opposing
side, yet, if we accept counsel's contention, the witness's lips are
sealed in Court although having been required to divulge everything out of Court. It does not seem fair to permit the adversary to cull from the deposition.only those facts which are useful
to him and to bar from the consideration of the jury those questions and answers which are unfavorable to him." 2
It is significant to note that the Mutual Life Ins. Co. case was
decided prior to Hickman v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court
of the United States said that, under Rule 26 of the FederalRules,
"[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that
end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession."2 The point is that, so long as the testimony is obtained by deposition for discovery purposes and is not
offered in evidence at trial, it is not evidentiary support for the
trier of fact's decision or a part of the record for the appellate
court's review. 24 Such an interpretation preserves both the underlying discovery purpose of Rule 26 and, at the same tine, gives full
recognition to the policy behind the waiver provision of Section
31-0103 as stated by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in the
Frink case:
* *

*

"To permit the party for whose benefit the statute is

enacted to call a witness and interrogate him on some transaction pertinent to the issue, and then limit him to that part of
the transaction regarding which he testified, would be giving an
unfair advantage to the representative of the decedent . . . If

the party to the action desire [sic] to have the protection afforded him, lie must not call the opposite party to testify ...,,
5
Tempting though it might be to construe the taking of a deposition as a waiver of Section 31-0103 and thus further avoid its rule
of incompetency, such cannot be accomplished except by resorting
to the fiction that testimony taken by deposition is evidence per
se. Such is plainly not the case and any abrogation of the statute
on policy grounds as set forth, for example, in the North Dakota
case of St. John v. Lofland, would best be accomplished by abol26
ishing the rule in its entirety.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See note 19 supra at 952.
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
See Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765, 771 (D. C. Nebr. 1953).
Frink v. Taylor, 59 N.D. 47, 228 N.W. 459, 462-463 (1930).

26. See note 3 supra.
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